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Abstract 
The study examines the effect of board diversity and 
audit committee on earnings management of listed 
Deposit Money Banks in Nigeria, for low and high 
leveraged Banks. Earnings Management is measured 
using Chang, Shen and Fang (2008) model. All the 15 
banks listed in Nigerian Stock Exchange as at 2015 were 
used for the analysis. Data were obtained from the 
financial statements covering the period 2008-2015. 
Multiple regression technique was employed, while the 
tool of analysis is Stata 13. The findings revealed that, all 
the variables have significant effect on earnings 
management of banks except for women directors and 
board size under the low leveraged banks, while board 
ownership was also found to have weak impact on 
earnings management under the high leveraged banks. 
Meanwhile, the findings also revealed that the 
explanatory variables under the low explained earnings 
management better than high leveraged. 
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1.1 Introduction 
Earnings management has dominated the literature of accounting since the witness of the 
financial scandals around the world by various institutions most especially Enron 
Corporation, Tyco, A.P., Xerox, HealthSouth and WorldCom in the U.S, Adelphia 
Communication Corporation in Pennsylvania, Parmalat in Italy and Cardbury in Nigeria 
among others have drawn the attention of many among practitioners, the regulators, 
researchers and other stakeholders to finding the possible solution in corporate 
businesses. 
Earnings management practice has been increasing in recent years in the Nigerian banking 
industry to attract unsuspecting investors, or obtain undeserved accounting-based 
rewards by presenting an exaggerated misleading or deceptive state of bank financial 
affairs, such as the case of Oceanic Bank Plc and Intercontinental Bank Plc. 
Board Diversity is seen as the variation of the age, race, ethnicity, gender, and 
social/cultural identities among employees within a specific corporation (Marimuthu, 
2008). Board diversity in respect of board gender, board ownership, board nationality, 
board size, board composition and audit committee have drawn scholar’s attention in 
recent times due to its effect on earnings management.  
Furthermore, an audit committee has been identified as core to financial reporting quality. 
The Board is expected to establish audit committees which comprise of six members both 
from non-executive and outside members (shareholders). Also, the corporate governance 
code for banks require them to meet at least four times in a year wherein they are 
expected to improve the quality of financial reporting and hence reduce level of 
opportunistic behaviours by managers (Hassan & Farouk, 2014). Meanwhile, the basic 
function of audit committees are to oversee the financial reporting process, monitor 
managers’ tendencies to manipulative earnings, increase the audit quality and reduce the 
questioning of board of directors.  
Previous studies in Nigeria and some other developed economies have only looked at the 
relationship between board diversity and earnings management without taking into 
cognizant the characteristics of the firms and the possibility of the firms acting differently 
in certain given condition. Scholars such as Bartov (1993) and Wasimullah, Toor and 
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Abbas (2010) argued that financial difficulties provides firms with more motivation to 
engage in earnings management. Therefore, it is of interest to this study to divide the 
listed Deposit Money Banks (DMBs) into low leveraged and high leveraged banks to assess 
the effect of board diversity and audit committee on earnings management.  
The decision to focus on the DMBs stems from the fact that the Banks are one of the 
vibrant sectors that drives the Nigeria economy; there is thus, the need for adequate focus 
on such sector. Also, the justification for choosing DMBs is premised on the fact that, it is 
still an area with paucity of studies on this topic particularly in term assessing the banks 
based on categories.  
1.2  Objectives of the Study 
The major objective of the study is to examine whether board diversity effect on earnings 
management differs between low leveraged and high leveraged banks in Nigeria. Based on 
the objective, the study hypothesized that: 
Ho: Board diversity effect on earnings management do not significantly differ between low 
leveraged and high leveraged banks in Nigeria. 
H1: Board diversity effect on earnings management significantly differ between low 
leveraged and high leveraged banks in Nigeria 
The use of partitioned regression will make the regulators and the investors appreciate 
the situation under which the managers are more likely to use aggressive earnings 
management and as such be more vigilant and watchful against the managers to avoid 
such happening in the organization. 
2.0 Literature Review 
This section discuss the concepts such as board diversity and earnings management used 
in the study. The section further review empirical literatures in relation to the variables 
being examined, while the section end with discussion of theories which underpin the 
variables. . 
2.1 Earnings Management 
Earnings management have been defined by various scholars. However there is no 
consensus on the best definition of the concept. According to Rahman, Mohammad and 
Jamil (2013), earnings management may be defined as reasonable and legal management 
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decision making and reporting intended to achieve stable and predictable financial results. 
In similar vein, Schipper (1989) defined earnings management as the process of taking 
deliberate steps within the constraints of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles to 
bring about a desired level of reported income. Also, Naser (1993) defines creative 
accounting as the transformation of financial accounting figures from what they actually 
are to what preparers’ desire by taking advantage of the existing rules and or ignoring 
some or all of them. These definitions sees earnings management as legal and reasonable 
decision taken by management since it does not alter any accounting principles. 
2.3 Board Diversity 
Diversity means having a range of many people that are different from each other. There 
is, however, no uniform definition of board diversity. Traditionally speaking, one can 
consider factors like age, race, gender, educational background and professional 
qualifications of the directors to make the board less homogenous. Van der Walt and 
Ingley (2003) define diversity in the composition of the Board as the varied combination 
of attributes, characteristics and skills that their members have.  
2.4 Review of Empirical Studies 
Psychology and management literature have long acknowledged that significant gender-
based differences exist, for instance, in leadership styles, communicative skills, 
conservatism, risk averseness, and decision-making. Given these differences and their 
potential implications for corporate governance, the issue of gender diversity has begun to 
receive increasing attention in corporate finance and corporate governance literature over 
the past few years. Several studies have recently focused on the effects that female 
executives and directors may potentially have on the firm’s financial performance and 
market value. This work attempts to extend this literature by addressing the effects of 
board diversity which include female executives on earnings management. 
Eze (2017) used a sample of six (6) firms out of eleven (11) firms in the Nigerian food 
product firms for a period of twelve years from 2003 to 2014. It was found that board 
gender has negative but insignificant relationship with earnings management. In a similar 
study by Firoozi, Magnan and Fortin (2016) using a population of Canadian firms in 
compustat from 2008 -2012 and a sample of 260 firms. Their findings revealed that board 
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gender diversity do not have any significant impact on financial reporting quality of firms. 
Van der Zwet (2015) found that the only significant results in gender diversity, are found 
with the Modified Jones Model without year and industry dummies. That is, as expected, a 
negative relationship between the percentage of women and earnings management. 
Einer and Soderqvist (2016) and Arun, Almahrog and Aribi (2015) found a negative 
association between earnings management and female representation on board of 
director. This implies that the presence of a number of female directors on the board 
constrains the level of earnings management. A similar study conducted in Nigeria by 
Omoye and Eriki (2014), they found that board gender has significant negative impact on 
earnings management and they concluded that when the number of female on board is 
increased, the earnings management of the firms will decrease. 
While the division of control and ownership in corporations is now common in the 
modern business environment, it also creates a severe conflict of interest between owners 
and agents. Managers who possess power may have an incentive to use firm resources for 
their own benefit and expropriate wealth in terms of bonuses or other benefits at the cost 
of shareholders (Beasley, 1996). The alignment-of-interest hypothesis states that, when 
managers’ ownership stake in a firm increases, it reduces the agency conflict between 
shareholders and managers (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). This should, in turn, reduce the 
scope for opportunistic behavior on the part of managers.  While the entrenchment 
hypothesis states that ownership stakes beyond a certain level put managers in a 
dominant position, which they can use to exploit external minority shareholders (Morck, 
Shleifer, & Vishny, 1988).   
Parveen, Malik, Mahmood and Ali Jan (2016) found that director ownership negatively and 
significantly influences the tendencies of manipulative activities of the managers while 
foreign ownership positively and significantly influences the tendencies of manipulative 
activities of the managers. Swai and Mbogela (2016) using a sample of 44 non-financial 
East African listed firms for years from 2003 to 2013. The study found that managerial 
ownership has significant negative effect on real earnings management. Nguyen (2016) 
documented that firms with higher managerial ownership marginally reduces earnings 
manipulation in firms subject to considerate debt level and also found that firms with 
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higher proportion of foreign ownership are more likely to constrain the manipulative 
practices exercised by managers. Ratnawati, Abdul Hamid and Popoola (2016) shows that 
managerial ownership affects earnings management practices. Institutional ownership 
and firm size moderate the relationship between managerial ownership and earnings 
management. Ramadan (2015) used 77th Jordanian industrial companies listed at Amman 
Stock Exchange (ASE) for the period 2000-2014 with 1089 firm-year observations. The 
result shows that management ownership is associated inversely with the practices of 
earnings management. 
As a result of the ongoing globalization, foreign ownership has subsequently become 
major institutional shareholders in Nigeria and the world at-large (Farouk & Shehu 2014). 
The role of foreign shareholders as an institutional shareholder has often been categorized 
by two conflicting views: i. Active monitoring and ii. Transient hypotheses. As posited by 
the advocates of active monitoring hypothesis, they regard institutional investors as long-
term investors with significant incentives to actively oversee managers. It is believed that 
external monitoring by foreign investors can restrain the opportunistic tendencies by 
managers for discretionary choices of management in providing financial accounting 
information, thus, increasing their earnings quality. 
Van den Berg (2015) results did not support the hypothesis that firms with more 
nationality diverse boards of directors have lower levels of earnings management. Abdul 
Rauf, Johari, Buniamin, and Abd Rahman (2012) used content analysis on the annual 
report of 214 companies for the year 2008. Their study reveals that board race do not 
influence the practice of earnings management. A study from Netherland by 
Hooghiemstra, Hermes, Oxelheim and Randoy (2015) found that foreign director is 
positively, strongly and significantly influencing earnings management of firms.  
Daghsnii, Zouhayer and Mbarek (2016) found that the earnings management is negatively 
associated with size of the board which suggests that large boards are more effective in 
monitoring a CEO‘s action. However, the found no effect of the board independence on the 
earnings management. In another study by Jamaludina, Sanusib and Kamaluddina (2015), 
they reported a negative but insignificant effect of board size on earnings management for 
26 Malaysian listed GLCs from various industries while a significant negative support on 
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the association between boards of directors’ composition towards earnings management 
is documented. Iraya, Mwangi and Muchoki (2015) used a population of 49 companies 
trading at the NSE between January 2010 and December 2012. It was documented that 
earnings management is negatively related to board size. In another study by Fodio, 
Ibikunle and Oba (2013) board size was found to have negatively and significantly 
associated with earnings management. Baimukhamedova and Baimukhamedova (2015) 
found that board composition has significant negative effect on earnings management. 
Yasser and Al Mamun (2016) results suggest that audit committee size is positively as-
sociated with financial reporting quality. They also noted that, instead of adding value, 
audit committee independence is negatively associated with reporting quality. Their 
results indicate that the audit committee is a less significant factor in corporate 
governance than suggested by many previous researchers and policy makers. 
Chandrasegaram, Rahimansa, Rahman, Abdullah and Nik Mat (2013) found that audit 
committee plays a significant role in mitigating earnings management of firms. Ayemere 
and Elijah (2015) findings confirm that audit committee characteristics have a 
constraining effect on earnings management. Specifically, audit committee financial 
expertise, audit committee size, audit committee independence and diligence showed an 
inverse and significant relationship with earnings management. Xi'an and Xi'an (2012) 
found that audit committee gender have a negative and significant influence on earnings 
management of firms. On the other hand, the study conducted by Ioualalen, Khemakhem 
and Fontaine (2015) using Canadian data with a sample of 10 firms within the period of 
1999-2003 found that audit committee diversity does not have any significant impact on 
earnings management of selected Canadian firms.  
This study adopts agency theory due to its relevance in resolving conflict of interest that 
may arise between managers (agent) and shareholders (principal) of the banks through 
the use of share held by directors, the number of the board members numbers and its 
composition. 
3.1 Methodology 
The study adopts the ex-post facto research design. Quantitative and deductive approach 
is employed and the study align itself with positivism paradigm. The study covers all the 
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15 DMBs listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange as at 31st December, 2008 and remain 
listed up till 2015. Secondary source of data was used and were extracted from the 
Published Audited Annual Reports and Accounts of the Banks. Multiple Regression 
Technique was adopted for the study. In addition, partitioned regression was carried out 
by categorizing the listed deposit money banks into two categories which are high 
leveraged Banks and low leveraged Banks. The mean of the banks’ leverage was used as a 
basis of the D into low leveraged and high leveraged. The average mean was 0.86325 (see 
Appendix). Therefore, any bank whose leverage is 0.86 and above is categorized as high 
leveraged banks and those banks whose leverage is below 0.86 is considered as low 
leveraged banks. Stata 13 was used as tool of data analysis. Robustness tests such as 
multicolinearity test, normality test, heteroscedasticity test, hausman specification test, 
langrarian multiplier test were conducted. The study uses Chang, Shen and Fang (2008) 
model of discretionary loan loss provision in the first model. The residual of which was 
used to represent earnings management in the second model. 
 
DLLPi /TAt-1 = LLPit/TAt-1  – {α0 1/TAt-1 + α1 LCOi/TAt-1 + α2 BBALi/TAt-1}…(i) 
 
EMit = β0it + β1Wdirit + β2Bownit + β3Fdirit  
                 + β4Bsizeit + β5Bodcit + β6Accit + µit… (ii) 
 
In the first model, DLLP = Discretionary loan loss provision, LLPit = Loan loss provision, 
LCOi = Loan Charge-off, BBAL = Beginning Balance of loan loss, TAt-1 = Lagged Total Assets, 
α0 = Constant. In the second model, EMit = Earnings Management, Wdirit = Women Director 
is measured as Number of women on board over the total number of board members 
(Bathula, 2008), Bownit = Board Ownership measured is Ratio of shares held by directors 
divided by total shares in issue (Farouk, 2014), Fdirit = Foreign Director is measured as the 
number of foreign directors on board divided by total number of board members (Abdul 
Rauf, Johari, Buniamin, & Abd Rahman, 2012), Bsizeit = Board Size is measured as the 
number of board members in a particular year (Daghsnii, Zouhayer & Mbarek, 2016), 
Bodcit = Board Composition is measured as ratio of non-executive directors to the total 
Journal of Accounting, Finance and Auditing Studies 4/1 (2018) 14-39 
22 
 
number of directors on board (Arabborzoo, Rashidpuran & Arabi, 2015), Accit = Audit 
Committee is measured as the average of audit committee which include number of audit 
committee size, the composition of audit committee and the number of meetings held was 
used, β1-β6 = Coefficient of explanatory variables, βo = Constant or Intercept, µ = Error 
Term, it = Companies and Time 
4.1 Results and Discussion 
This section present, analyses, discusses and make comparison between low leveraged 
banks and high leveraged banks in relation to board diversity, audit committee effect on 
earnings management.  
 
Table 4.5 Summary of Random Effect Model 
  Low Leveraged High Leveraged 
Variables Coeffi Z-Stat Prob Coeffi Z-Stat Prob 
Constant 0.266 4.45 0.000* 0.084 3.83 0.000* 
Wdir -0.010 -1.04 0.297 -0.015 -2.61 0.009* 
Bown 0.029 3.18 0.001* 0.004 1.33 0.184 
Fdir 0.065 3.62 0.000* 0.007 1.91 0.056*** 
Bsize -0.001 -1.08 0.282 -0.001 -1.66 0.096*** 
Bodc -0.047 -1.65 0.098*** -0.019 -2.34 0.019** 
Acc -0.023 4.34 0.000* -0.004 -1.93 0.054*** 
R2 Within 0.5698 0.6336 
R2 
Between 
0.4060 0.5442 
R2 Overall 0.4046 0.3894 
Wald Chi2 44.07 80.92 
Prob. 0.0000   0.0000   
Result output from Stata 13 
*, **, *** indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significant level respectively 
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The cumulative R2 overall of 0.4046 and 0.3894 for low leveraged and high leveraged 
banks shows the that 40.46% and 38.94% of variation in the earnings management of 
listed DMBs are explained by its women director, board ownership, foreign director, board 
size, board composition and audit committee jointly.  
The Wald Chi2 values of 44.07 and 80.92 for low leveraged and high leveraged models 
which are significant at one percent respectively indicates the fitness of the models. This 
however implies that, for any change in board diversity and audit committee variables; the 
earnings management of listed Banks is directly affected. The Probability values of Wald 
chi2 which were significant at a level of 1% for both models indicate that there is a 99.9% 
probability that the relationship among the variables cannot be due to mere occurrence 
which in addition connote that the independent variables of the study reliably predict the 
dependent variable. 
i. Women director and Earnings Management 
From the Table 4.5a, it was observed that the z-value for women director is -1.04 for low 
leveraged banks and -2.61 for high leveraged banks, while the coefficient for both models 
in respect of women director is -0.010 and -0.015 respectively with significant value of 
0.297 and 0.009 respectively. This shows that women director has negative but 
insignificant effect on earnings management of low leveraged banks, while for high 
leveraged banks, significant negative effect of women director on earnings management is 
documented. 
ii. Board Ownership and Earnings Management 
The regression results for low leveraged banks revealed that board ownership has 
positive and significant effect on earnings management. This is shown in Table 4.5a as the 
z-value is 3.18 and a coefficient value of 0.029 which is significant at 1%. However, for the 
high leveraged banks, board ownership recorded a z-value of 1.33 and a coefficient value 
of 0.004 which is neither significant at 1%, 5% nor 10% level. These implies that board 
ownership has an insignificant positive effect on earnings management of Banks. 
iii. Foreign Director and Earnings Management 
Foreign director variable for low leveraged and high leveraged banks model has a z-value 
of 3.62 and 1.91, and a coefficient value of 0.065 and 0.007 respectively and model one is 
Journal of Accounting, Finance and Auditing Studies 4/1 (2018) 14-39 
24 
 
significant at 1%, but significant at 10% in the second model. This shows that foreign 
director has significant positive effect on earnings management of banks for both low and 
high leveraged banks in Nigeria. 
iv. Board Size and Earnings Management 
The result in respect of board size for both low and high leveraged banks recorded a z-
values of -1.08 and -1.66, and a coefficient values of -0.001 and -0.001 respectively; of 
which only model was significant at 10% level. This indicates that board size has negative 
but significant effect on earnings management in high leveraged banks in Nigeria. 
v. Board Composition and Earnings Management 
From the Table 4.5a above, the z-value for board composition is -1.65 for low leveraged 
banks and -2.34 for high leveraged banks, while the coefficient for both models in respect 
of board composition is -0.047 and -0.019 respectively. Both were significant at 10% and 
5% respectively. This signifies that board composition has significant negative effect on 
earnings management of low and high leveraged banks in Nigeria. 
vi. Audit Committee and Earnings Management 
In low leveraged banks, audit committee recorded a z-values of -4.34 and -1.93 for high 
leveraged banks, while the coefficient for both models in respect of audit committee is -
0.023 and -0.004 with a significant value of 1% and 5% respectively. This signifies that 
audit committee has significant negative effect on earnings management of low and high 
leveraged banks in Nigeria 
Comparison between the low leveraged and high leveraged Banks in Nigeria 
On the overall, when the R2 of the two categories of banks are compared for both low 
leveraged banks and high leveraged banks, board diversity for low leveraged banks have 
more significant effect on earnings management than that of the high leveraged banks. 
This can be substantiated by the R2 of 0.4046 for low leveraged banks and 0.3894 for high 
leveraged banks from the two models. The differences in the R2 between low leveraged 
and high leveraged banks is 1.52%. 
Further, comparing this two models, the probability values for the two categories of banks 
showcase that explanatory variables (women director, board ownership, foreign director, 
board size, board composition and audit committee) of low leveraged banks significantly 
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explain the variation in the level of earnings management better than that of the high 
leveraged banks. 
Consequently, comparing the two results from the models, looking at the direction of the 
coefficients, the level of significance of the coefficients, the magnitude of the coefficients, 
the coefficient of determination and their fisher exact test clearly show that there was 
significant difference between the low and high leveraged banks. This results however 
provide an evidence of rejecting null hypothesis which state that board diversity and audit 
committee effect on earnings management do not significantly differ between the low 
leveraged and high leveraged banks in Nigeria. 
Finally, the findings shed more light on board diversity, audit committee and earnings 
management studies in the sense that earnings management practices mitigations using 
board diversity and audit committee varies across banks most especially when they are 
categorized under the low leveraged and high leveraged banks. 
5.1 Conclusions 
The aim of the study is to examine whether the effects of board diversity on earnings 
management differ between low leveraged and high leveraged banks in Nigeria. Fifteen 
(15) banks were studied using quantitative approach within the positivism paradigm. Data 
were sourced from financial statements and partitioned regression was carried out 
between high leveraged and low leveraged banks. We conclude that managerial attitude 
towards earnings manipulations are same in either situation. This indicates that risk 
profile and debt structure and possible covenants pressures do not derive opportunistic 
behavior of managers. Earning manipulations in these banks could be considered to be 
triggered by ex post efficiency concerns, managerial job security motives and the need to 
sustenance shareholder confidence and prospective investors. The result of this study is 
limited to bank leverage classification based on partitioning regression analysis and may 
not be applicable to other non-bank financial firms and non-financial firms in Nigeria. Also, 
different bank leverage categorization or stratification may also yield different results and 
this may be an avenue for future studies.  
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Appendix 
 
 
 
 
                delta:  1 year
        time variable:  year, 2008 to 2015
       panel variable:  id (strongly balanced)
. xtset id year, yearly
99%       .14359         .14507       Kurtosis       24.12794
95%      .041295         .14359       Skewness       4.587297
90%       .00436         .14148       Variance       .0006217
75%         .001         .09301
                        Largest       Std. Dev.      .0249345
50%        .0003                      Mean           .0070152
25%       .00014         .00004       Sum of Wgt.         120
10%      .000085         .00004       Obs                 120
 5%       .00004         .00003
 1%       .00003         .00003
      Percentiles      Smallest
                                                             
                             em
. su em wdir bown fdir bsize bodc acc wdirac bownac, detail
99%          .58             .6       Kurtosis        6.16595
95%         .285            .58       Skewness       1.188963
90%          .26            .42       Variance       .0121626
75%           .2            .37
                        Largest       Std. Dev.      .1102841
50%          .14                      Mean           .1376667
25%         .065              0       Sum of Wgt.         120
10%            0              0       Obs                 120
 5%            0              0
 1%            0              0
      Percentiles      Smallest
                                                             
                            wdir
99%        49.93          55.19       Kurtosis       5.846214
95%        35.62          49.93       Skewness       1.825749
90%        29.57          43.94       Variance       138.2594
75%       11.775          42.74
                        Largest       Std. Dev.      11.75837
50%        3.895                      Mean           9.321667
25%        1.395           1.02       Sum of Wgt.         120
10%         1.06           1.02       Obs                 120
 5%         1.02           1.02
 1%         1.02           1.02
      Percentiles      Smallest
                                                             
                            bown
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99%          .46             .5       Kurtosis       3.235546
95%         .395            .46       Skewness       1.209669
90%         .355            .45       Variance       .0191775
75%         .165            .43
                        Largest       Std. Dev.      .1384829
50%            0                      Mean           .1008148
25%            0              0       Sum of Wgt.         120
10%            0              0       Obs                 120
 5%            0              0
 1%            0              0
      Percentiles      Smallest
                                                             
                            Fdir
99%           21             21       Kurtosis       2.962926
95%           19             21       Skewness      -.1241366
90%           18             20       Variance       6.855392
75%           16             19
                        Largest       Std. Dev.       2.61828
50%           15                      Mean           14.79167
25%           13              9       Sum of Wgt.         120
10%         11.5              9       Obs                 120
 5%           11              8
 1%            8              8
      Percentiles      Smallest
                                                             
                            bsize
99%          .87            .88       Kurtosis       4.206201
95%         .825            .87       Skewness       .5818536
90%         .735            .87       Variance       .0127286
75%          .61            .83
                        Largest       Std. Dev.      .1128209
50%          .57                      Mean           .5699167
25%           .5             .4       Sum of Wgt.         120
10%          .43             .4       Obs                 120
 5%          .42            .36
 1%          .36            .21
      Percentiles      Smallest
                                                             
                            bodc
Journal of Accounting, Finance and Auditing Studies 4/1 (2018) 14-39 
32 
 
 
 
 
99%      16.1005        16.2373       Kurtosis       4.331122
95%     15.41245        16.1005       Skewness      -.6560681
90%     14.77595          15.82       Variance       2.545918
75%     13.53765        15.7509
                        Largest       Std. Dev.      1.595593
50%      13.0222                      Mean           12.78301
25%      12.1695        9.16331       Sum of Wgt.         120
10%      10.7407        8.82405       Obs                 120
 5%     9.471435        8.16331
 1%      8.16331        7.16331
      Percentiles      Smallest
                                                             
                             acc
              
                 0.3877   0.2967   0.0000   0.5379   0.3277   0.6201   0.8593
      bownac    -0.0796  -0.0961   0.9900*  0.0568  -0.0901  -0.0457  -0.0163 
              
                 0.9515   0.0000   0.2548   0.9090   0.0271   0.3073   0.4523
      wdirac     0.0056   0.9821* -0.1048   0.0105   0.2017*  0.0940   0.0693 
              
                 0.0000   0.2934   0.2063   0.0570   0.1896   0.4540
         acc    -0.3963* -0.0967  -0.1162  -0.1743  -0.1206   0.0690   1.0000 
              
                 0.4032   0.4429   0.5724   0.0000   0.2138
        bodc    -0.0770   0.0707  -0.0520   0.3721*  0.1143   1.0000 
              
                 0.2112   0.0175   0.4443   0.0834
       bsize    -0.1150   0.2166* -0.0705  -0.1587   1.0000 
              
                 0.0970   0.7974   0.4668
        fdir    -0.1522   0.0237   0.0671   1.0000 
              
                 0.6170   0.3387
        bown    -0.0461  -0.0881   1.0000 
              
                 0.3815
        wdir     0.0806   1.0000 
              
              
          em     1.0000 
                                                                             
                     em     wdir     bown     fdir    bsize     bodc      acc
. pwcorr em wdir bown fdir bsize bodc acc wdirac bownac, star (0.05) sig
              
                 0.3041
      bownac    -0.0946   1.0000 
              
              
      wdirac     1.0000 
                                
                 wdirac   bownac
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Descriptive Statistics for Leverage to ascertain high and low leveraged Banks 
 
 
 
 
 
99%         1.28           1.32       Kurtosis       13.71162
95%          .96           1.28       Skewness       2.528072
90%          .92           1.16       Variance       .0074625
75%          .89           1.13
                        Largest       Std. Dev.      .0863855
50%          .86                      Mean             .86325
25%          .82            .73       Sum of Wgt.         120
10%          .79            .72       Obs                 120
 5%          .75            .72
 1%          .72            .71
      Percentiles      Smallest
                                                             
                             lev
. su lev, detail
                delta:  1 year
        time variable:  year, 2008 to 2015, but with a gap
       panel variable:  id (unbalanced)
. xtset id year, yearly
                                                                              
       _cons     .2498644   .0677772     3.69   0.001     .1135143    .3862144
         acc    -.0232623   .0051765    -4.49   0.000     -.033676   -.0128486
        bodc    -.0489547   .0326245    -1.50   0.140    -.1145867    .0166774
       bsize    -.0009763   .0018525    -0.53   0.601     -.004703    .0027504
        fdir      .061976   .0178423     3.47   0.001      .026082      .09787
        bown     .0312839   .0095263     3.28   0.002     .0121194    .0504483
        wdir    -.0028637   .0094504    -0.30   0.763    -.0218754    .0161481
                                                                              
          em        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    .047884706    53  .000903485           Root MSE      =  .02431
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.3460
    Residual    .027771524    47  .000590883           R-squared     =  0.4200
       Model    .020113182     6  .003352197           Prob > F      =  0.0002
                                                       F(  6,    47) =    5.67
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      54
. reg em wdir bown fdir bsize bodc acc
         Prob > chi2  =   0.0000
         chi2(1)      =    94.84
         Variables: fitted values of em
         Ho: Constant variance
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
. hettest
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    Mean VIF        3.08
                                    
        bodc        1.35    0.739400
       bsize        1.70    0.587006
        wdir        1.94    0.515541
        bown        1.96    0.510301
        fdir        5.32    0.188048
         acc        6.20    0.161284
                                    
    Variable         VIF       1/VIF  
. vif
. est store fixed
F test that all u_i=0:     F(11, 36) =     3.95              Prob > F = 0.0008
                                                                              
         rho    .70186405   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .01870081
     sigma_u    .02869325
                                                                              
       _cons       .36877   .0720975     5.11   0.000     .2225494    .5149906
         acc    -.0314362   .0075607    -4.16   0.000      -.04677   -.0161024
        bodc    -.0580628   .0294813    -1.97   0.057    -.1178536     .001728
       bsize    -.0030054   .0019743    -1.52   0.137    -.0070095    .0009987
        fdir     .0797245    .024039     3.32   0.002     .0309711    .1284779
        bown     .0386026   .0118311     3.26   0.002     .0146081    .0625972
        wdir    -.0085138   .0140114    -0.61   0.547    -.0369301    .0199026
                                                                              
          em        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.4841                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(6,36)            =      8.30
       overall = 0.3977                                        max =         8
       between = 0.4094                                        avg =       4.5
R-sq:  within  = 0.5803                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: id                              Number of groups   =        12
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =        54
. xtreg em wdir bown fdir bsize bodc acc, fe
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. est store random
                                                                              
         rho    .44946245   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .01870081
     sigma_u    .01689716
                                                                              
       _cons     .2659414   .0598259     4.45   0.000     .1486849    .3831979
         acc    -.0230035   .0053016    -4.34   0.000    -.0333945   -.0126126
        bodc     -.047007   .0284477    -1.65   0.098    -.1027635    .0087494
       bsize    -.0018334   .0017043    -1.08   0.282    -.0051738     .001507
        fdir     .0656597   .0181372     3.62   0.000     .0301114     .101208
        bown     .0289526   .0091038     3.18   0.001     .0111095    .0467957
        wdir    -.0104255   .0099957    -1.04   0.297    -.0300167    .0091656
                                                                              
          em        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(6)       =     44.07
       overall = 0.4046                                        max =         8
       between = 0.4060                                        avg =       4.5
R-sq:  within  = 0.5698                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: id                              Number of groups   =        12
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =        54
. xtreg em wdir bown fdir bsize bodc acc, re
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite)
                Prob>chi2 =      0.2995
                          =        7.24
                  chi2(6) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
         acc     -.0314362    -.0230035       -.0084327        .0053905
        bodc     -.0580628     -.047007       -.0110558        .0077379
       bsize     -.0030054    -.0018334        -.001172        .0009966
        fdir      .0797245     .0656597        .0140648        .0157771
        bown      .0386026     .0289526          .00965        .0075562
        wdir     -.0085138    -.0104255        .0019118        .0098186
                                                                              
                   fixed        random       Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
. hausman fixed random
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                          Prob > chibar2 =   0.0001
                             chibar2(01) =    14.43
        Test:   Var(u) = 0
                       u     .0002855       .0168972
                       e     .0003497       .0187008
                      em     .0009035        .030058
                                                       
                                 Var     sd = sqrt(Var)
        Estimated results:
        em[id,t] = Xb + u[id] + e[id,t]
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects
. xttest0
                delta:  1 year
        time variable:  year, 2008 to 2015, but with gaps
       panel variable:  id (unbalanced)
. xtset id year, yearly
                                                                              
       _cons     .1309091   .0261226     5.01   0.000     .0786379    .1831803
         acc    -.0081276   .0023618    -3.44   0.001    -.0128536   -.0034016
        bodc    -.0423498    .018623    -2.27   0.027    -.0796144   -.0050853
       bsize    -.0015072   .0006813    -2.21   0.031    -.0028705   -.0001439
        fdir     .0194637   .0052133     3.73   0.000      .009032    .0298955
        bown     .0102412   .0051492     1.99   0.051    -.0000622    .0205447
        wdir    -.0122381   .0065391    -1.87   0.066    -.0253229    .0008467
                                                                              
          em        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    .025622552    65  .000394193           Root MSE      =  .01554
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.3873
    Residual    .014249046    59  .000241509           R-squared     =  0.4439
       Model    .011373506     6  .001895584           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  6,    59) =    7.85
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      66
. reg em wdir bown fdir bsize bodc acc
         Prob > chi2  =   0.0000
         chi2(1)      =   173.25
         Variables: fitted values of em
         Ho: Constant variance
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
. hettest
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    Mean VIF        1.99
                                    
        bodc        1.13    0.886824
       bsize        1.25    0.799932
        fdir        1.47    0.678801
        wdir        1.95    0.512042
        bown        2.31    0.433126
         acc        3.83    0.260989
                                    
    Variable         VIF       1/VIF  
. vif
. est store fixed
F test that all u_i=0:     F(12, 47) =    50.18              Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                              
         rho    .98091832   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .00468515
     sigma_u    .03359168
                                                                              
       _cons     .0682449   .0201211     3.39   0.001     .0277665    .1087233
         acc    -.0034149   .0022439    -1.52   0.135    -.0079292    .0010993
        bodc     -.016719   .0078943    -2.12   0.040    -.0326003   -.0008378
       bsize    -.0004608   .0003093    -1.49   0.143    -.0010831    .0001614
        fdir     .0057433   .0040244     1.43   0.160    -.0023527    .0138394
        bown     .0029708   .0031307     0.95   0.348    -.0033273    .0092689
        wdir    -.0164721   .0056425    -2.92   0.005    -.0278233   -.0051209
                                                                              
          em        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.1462                         Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(6,47)            =     13.65
       overall = 0.3637                                        max =         8
       between = 0.4972                                        avg =       5.1
R-sq:  within  = 0.6353                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: id                              Number of groups   =        13
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =        66
. xtreg em wdir bown fdir bsize bodc acc, fe
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. est store random
                                                                              
         rho    .96902307   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .00468515
     sigma_u    .02620423
                                                                              
       _cons     .0840853   .0219828     3.83   0.000     .0409999    .1271708
         acc    -.0043961   .0022826    -1.93   0.054    -.0088698    .0000777
        bodc    -.0193468   .0082547    -2.34   0.019    -.0355256   -.0031679
       bsize    -.0005377   .0003229    -1.66   0.096    -.0011706    .0000953
        fdir     .0078331   .0040987     1.91   0.056    -.0002002    .0158664
        bown      .004255    .003206     1.33   0.184    -.0020287    .0105387
        wdir    -.0149993   .0057413    -2.61   0.009    -.0262521   -.0037466
                                                                              
          em        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(6)       =     80.92
       overall = 0.3894                                        max =         8
       between = 0.5442                                        avg =       5.1
R-sq:  within  = 0.6336                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: id                              Number of groups   =        13
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =        66
. xtreg em wdir bown fdir bsize bodc acc, re
                                        see suest for a generalized test
                                        assumptions of the Hausman test;
                                        data fails to meet the asymptotic
                          =    -9.18    chi2<0 ==> model fitted on these
                  chi2(6) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
         acc     -.0034149    -.0043961        .0009811               .
        bodc      -.016719    -.0193468        .0026277               .
       bsize     -.0004608    -.0005377        .0000769               .
        fdir      .0057433     .0078331       -.0020897               .
        bown      .0029708      .004255       -.0012842               .
        wdir     -.0164721    -.0149993       -.0014727               .
                                                                              
                   fixed        random       Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
. hausman fixed random
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                Prob>chi2 =      0.0746
                          =       11.48
                  chi2(6) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
         acc     -.0034149    -.0043961        .0009811        .0006354
        bodc      -.016719    -.0193468        .0026277        .0011581
       bsize     -.0004608    -.0005377        .0000769        .0000488
        fdir      .0057433     .0078331       -.0020897        .0011214
        bown      .0029708      .004255       -.0012842        .0008053
        wdir     -.0164721    -.0149993       -.0014727        .0015916
                                                                              
                   fixed        random       Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
. hausman fixed random, sigmamore
                          Prob > chibar2 =   0.0593
                             chibar2(01) =     2.44
        Test:   Var(u) = 0
                       u     .0006867       .0262042
                       e      .000022       .0046852
                      em     .0003942       .0198543
                                                       
                                 Var     sd = sqrt(Var)
        Estimated results:
        em[id,t] = Xb + u[id] + e[id,t]
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects
. xttest0
